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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the relative prominence of religious expression in
society' and its elevated status in constitutional law, 2 the Supreme
Court has struggled to articulate a consistent standard of review for
neutral, generally applicable laws that indirectly burden religious
expression. Since the late nineteenth century, the Court has vacillated
between a highly deferential belief-action dichotomy3 and a more
searching (albeit selectively applied) compelling interest test.4
Currently, the Court embraces a hybrid categorical-rational basis
standard5 that relies in part upon a highly criticized 6 assumption that
the political process will be solicitous of minority religious practice.
This retreat to rational basis has subordinated religious belief to
political opinion by more rigorously protecting the latter. What's more,
the current state of law has declawed the Free Exercise Clause,
offering protection only in the "rare" case of a "law actually aimed at
suppressing religious exercise." 7

1.
See, e.g., Religion, GALLUP, http://www.galup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx, archived at
http://perma.cc/3L9W-JABQ (last visited Jan. 9, 2015) (reporting that seventy-eight percent of
Americans responded that religion was "very important" or "fairly important").
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2.
3.
E.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878).
4.
E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
5.
See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 & n.3 (1990) ("[Glenerally applicable,
religion-neutral laws that .. . burden[] a particular religious practice need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest. . . .").
6.
See, e.g., id. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The history of our free exercise doctrine
amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging
religious groups .... ); cf. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("The
very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy. . . .").
7.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 564 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring).
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To clarify free exercise law and restore the constitutionally
protected status of religious worship, the Court does not need to
articulate a new standard of review or even venture outside its First
Amendment canon. In free speech cases, the Court has already
recognized that speech and conduct are often intertwined into
"expressive conduct." 8 When generally applicable laws place an
indirect burden on expressive conduct, the Court applies the O'Brien
test, a carefully structured form of intermediate review.9 While
imperfect,10 O'Brien balances the importance of uniform regulation of
conduct against the undue suppression of opinions or ideas.
No such middle ground exists in the free exercise context,
resulting in a bizarre asymmetry. Currently, when the government
indirectly burdens religious conduct, it must assert only a rational
basis for doing so. Thus, religious conduct receives constitutional
protection only when the government acts in an irrational manner or
in a way that directly limits religious expression. But acts of worship
and the observance of sacraments are means through which religious
persons outwardly express deeply held convictions. In other words,
many forms of religious conduct can be deemed a subset of expressive
conduct. When a general law places an incidental burden on
expressive conduct, it should not matter whether the font of
expression is political opinion or religious conviction. This
inconsistency has no basis in the text or history of the First
Amendment," which is equally resolute in its protection of speech and
religion. 12 In addition to being of questionable pedigree, the Court's
current jurisprudence fails to recognize that "speech" and "religion"
are often nothing more than labels; expressive conduct protected
under the Free Speech Clause can be functionally indistinguishable
from expressed belief left unprotected by the Free Exercise Clause.
Recognizing this incongruity is by no means novel; indeed, it
would be more revolutionary to argue that the Court has been
consistent in its approach to or application of First Amendment
protections. Other commentators have ably argued for a unified theory

8.
See infra Part III.B.
9.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
10.
See, e.g., David S. Day, The Incidental Regulation of Free Speech, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV.
491, 506 (1988) (arguing O'Brien "demonstrate[s] an eroding judicial commitment to free speech
values"); Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175,
1204 (1996) ("Given that the O'Brien test asks so little in principle, it should not be surprising
that it means so little in practice.").
11.
See infra text accompanying notes 235, 268-89.
12. U.S. CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech. . . .").
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of First Amendment jurisprudence13 and even specifically advocated
for intermediate scrutiny of religious exemptions to generally
applicable laws.' My contention is narrower. I submit that religiously
motivated acts of worship and sacrament are expressive conduct, not
just "conceptually or structurally" 15 but substantively. By applying
intermediate scrutiny to laws that indirectly burden expressive
conduct but a rational basis standard to laws that burden expressed
belief, the Court has done exactly what it claims to be avoiding: it has
subordinated religious belief to political and philosophical opinion,
preferencing speakers over believers. In Parts II and III, this Note
lays out the contemporaneously developed yet needlessly divergent
tests the Court has applied to challenges to generally applicable laws
that indirectly burden First Amendment rights. Part IV analyzes the
effect this has had on First Amendment law, namely that it has
subordinated faith to opinion and circumscribed free exercise
protection. Part V offers both short- and long-term solutions to achieve
parity between religious and nonreligious claimants.
II. A DOCTRINE IN DISARRAY: RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM
GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAWS

In free exercise law, there are two relatively easy types of
cases: direct regulation of religious belief, which is per se invalid, 16
and direct regulation of religious conduct, which must survive "the
most rigorous of scrutiny." 7 Today, however, it would be "nearly
unthinkable" for a legislature to pass a law that facially discriminates

13.
See generally, e.g., Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a
Unified Theory of FirstAmendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66
Mo. L. REV. 9 (2001); Thomas R. McCoy, A Coherent Methodology for First Amendment Speech
and Religion Clause Cases, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1335 (1995). But see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (advocating a rational basis approach in free
speech cases too).
14. See, e.g., David A. Bogen, Generally Applicable Laws and the First Amendment, 26 Sw.
U. L. REV. 201, 253 (1997) ('The obvious candidate for a test to evaluate neutral, generally
applicable laws is O'Brien"); James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CALIF. L.
REV. 91, 115 (1991) (noting the Court in Smith "ignor[ed] the intermediate scrutiny that applies
in analogous free speech cases").
15. McCoy, supranote 13, at 1365.
16. E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
17.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993).
The Lukumi Court applied what could be deemed strictest scrutiny, amplifying the traditional
strict scrutiny framework to require not just a "compelling interest" but a state interest "of the
highest order." Id. (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)).
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against a particular religious belief or practice.' 8 Moreover, barring a
real-life Thinkpol,1 9 it is unclear how the government could regulate
belief. Thus, the bulk of contemporary free exercise cases challenge
laws that indirectly burden religious expression, either by requiring
what a particular religion proscribes 20 or by prohibiting what a
particular religion commands. 21 In this area, the Court's jurisprudence
has been a history of extremes.
Section A analyzes the Court's first encounter with the Free
Exercise Clause, where a unanimous Court held that "Congress was
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to
reach actions." 22 This belief-action dichotomy was the dominant test
for almost a century.23 Section B describes the Court's seminal
decision in Sherbert v. Verner, where the Court required a compelling
government interest to sustain any state action that incidentally
burdened religious conduct.2 4 The Sherbert test, however, proved
unworkable in practice. As Section C chronicles, the Court interpreted
around Sherbert in several ways between 1963 and 1990. The death
knell for Sherbert finally arrived in Employment Division v. Smith,
where a narrowly divided Court rejected strict scrutiny except where
the purported burden fit within one of a few narrow categories. 25
Section D describes the Court's retreat to rational basis in Smith.
18. McCoy, supra note 13, at 1350; see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 564 (Souter, J., concurring)
(noting it is "rare" to find "a law actually aimed at suppressing religious exercise").
19. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 19 (Signet Classics 1977) (1949) ("The Thought Police would
get him just the same. He had committed-would still have committed, even if he had never set
pen to paper-the essential crime that contained all others in itself. Thoughtcrime, they called
it."); see infra note 29.
20. E.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (addressing a religious
objection by a closely held, for-profit company to an HHS regulation requiring employee.
sponsored health insurance to cover most forms of contraception).
21. E.g., Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Unido do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006)
(challenging a federal drug regulation that prohibited hoasca, a hallucinogenic tea ingested
sacramentally by members of the Unido do Vegetal church). Both Hobby Lobby and 0 Centro
involved statutory claims under the more protective Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA"), as opposed to constitutional claims under the Free Exercise Clause. The Court,
however, has limited RFRA's scope to include only certain actions of the federal government. For
a discussion of RFRA and how it has been circumscribed, see infra text accompanying notes 11014.
22. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) ("[T]he Amendment
23.
embraces two concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be.").
24.
374 U.S. 398 (1963). While the Court claimed that this ruling was consistent with its
past holdings, id. at 408-09, it is seemingly impossible to rectify these precedents. See id. at 417
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("I cannot agree that today's decision can stand consistently with
Braunfeld v. Brown."); see also infra note 51.
25. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Finally, Section E briefly surveys the response to Smith in public,
judicial, and scholarly opinion.
A. Absolute Belief and RationalAction: The Reynolds
Belief-Action Distinction
The Supreme Court did not hear its first free exercise case
until 1878,26 when George Reynolds, a leader in the Mormon Church,
was convicted under the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act,2 7 a federal law that
prohibited polygamy in the territories. The Court unanimously
rejected Reynolds's argument that polygamy was his religious duty
and that the Free Exercise Clause therefore enjoined his prosecution
under the Morrill Act. 2 8 The Court held, "Congress was deprived of all
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." 29
For the next eighty-five years, the Court would, for the most
part, hew closely to this belief-action dichotomy by treating belief as
untouchable3 0 but action as fully regulable. 31 Beginning in the 1940s,
however, the Court began recognizing exemptions from generally
applicable laws for claimants who proved that the law burdened their
religious exercise and some other interest of constitutional dimension.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, for example, a door-to-door evangelist was
convicted of violating a state law that prohibited soliciting money for a
religious or charitable organization without a license.32 While
Cantwell could have been convicted under a rigid application of the
Reynolds belief-action test, the Court described Cantwell's actions in

26. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145.
27.
Ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
28. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 160-67. Reynolds argued the judge should have instructed the
jury that, if his marriages were "in pursuance of and in conformity with . . . a religious duty, that
the verdict must be 'not guilty.'" Id. at 161-62.
29. Id. at 164. Barry Lynn points out how truly limited the Reynolds Court's articulation of
the Free Exercise Clause was: "[R]eligious belief could not be circumscribed by federal action (as
if it could, regardless of the position on the subject taken by the Court), but . . . actions based on
such religious belief could be regulated." Barry W. Lynn, The Sad State of Free Exercise in the
Courts, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING

70, 70

(Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991) (emphasis added).
30.
See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (invalidating a Maryland law
requiring all holders of public office to declare their belief in God under both the Free Exercise
Clause and Article VI).
See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-04 (1961) (refusing to grant an
31.
exemption from a Sunday closing law to Saturday sabbatarians).
32.
310 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1940). Specifically, Cantwell was a Jehovah's Witness who went
door-to-door playing a phonograph that attacked organized religion. After playing his record,
Cantwell would ask for contributions for the publication of evangelical pamphlets. Id.
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terms of speech rather than worship: "[W]e find only an effort to
persuade a willing listener to buy a book or to contribute money in the
interest of what Cantwell. . . conceived to be true religion."3 3 The
conviction, the Court held, was inimical to First Amendment valuesboth speech and religion. 34 Thus, Cantwell posed a hybrid religionspeech claim, and the Court imported free speech principles to protect
Cantwell's proselytization. Absent the viable speech claim, it is likely
the Court would have upheld the ordinance.
A similar issue arose in the flag-salute cases of the early 1940s.
In Minersville School District v.

Gobitis,35 a Jehovah's Witness

challenged the school district's policy of requiring all students to
participate in the Pledge of Allegiance. The Pledge, Gobitis asserted,
violated his belief that God and the Bible are man's ultimate
authority. 36 Relying on the state's interest in national unity and
patriotism, the Court rejected this claim, holding, "Conscientious
scruples have not .. . relieved the individual from obedience to a
general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious
beliefs." 37 Just three years later, however, the Court reconsidered this
exact question in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.38
In an opinion released on Flag Day, the Court expressly overruled its
earlier holding in Gobitis. Rather than focusing on Barnette's religious
claims, the Court focused on the free speech implications of requiring
any student to profess an oath of fidelity to any symbol. 39 "If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation," Justice Jackson
wrote, "it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." 40 As in
Cantwell, while the genesis of Barnette's objection was religious, the
source of his exemption was free speech. 4 1

33. Id. at 310.
34. Id. at 307 ("[T]o condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views
or systems upon a license . .. is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected
by the Constitution.").
35. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
36. Id. at 591-92 & n.1.
37. Id. at 594.
38. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
39. Id. at 638.
40. Id. at 642.
41. A third case often cited in this line is Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925),
where the Court held that Oregon could not require children to attend a public school. See Emp't
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (listing Pierce as a hybrid rights case that depended on
both religious and parental rights). On closer inspection, however, Pierce appears to rest entirely
on "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children."
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Despite these victories, prior to 1963, religious adherents were
unsuccessful when their claims rested solely on the Free Exercise
Clause. In Braunfeld v. Brown,42 for example, Orthodox Jewish
business owners challenged a law requiring most retailers to close on
Sundays. The petitioners argued that this law unduly burdened their
free exercise of religion because they already observed Saturdays as
their Sabbath; closing on Sundays as well, they worried, would
prevent them from turning a profit. 43 The law "put [the appellant] to a
choice between his business and his religion." 44 The Court, however,
relied on the Reynolds belief-action distinction to reject the petitioner's
claim, holding, "[L]egislative power over mere opinion is forbidden but
it may reach people's actions when they are found to be in violation of
important social duties ...
even when the actions are demanded by
45
one's religion." Because a state has the power to declare a uniform
day of rest, accommodating minority religious practices would
frustrate the very purpose of the legislation. 46
B. Sherbert, Yoder, and the Compelling State Interest Test
Just two years after Braunfeld, the Court took a dramatic step
in its free exercise jurisprudence. Adell Sherbert was a textile worker
in Beaumont, South Carolina, and a Seventh-Day Adventist who
observed Saturday as a mandatory day of rest and worship. The
textile mill where Sherbert worked expanded its workweek from five
days to six, requiring Sherbert to work on Saturdays. Sherbert's
refusal to work on Saturdays led to her termination. 47 While Sherbert
was offered other jobs from other companies, each required her to
work on Saturdays as well. 4 8 Unable to keep her job or obtain new
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (citation omitted). The First Amendment is not cited once in the
Court's analysis, and one of the schools challenging the ordinance, a private military academy,
had no religious claim to raise. Id. at 532-33; cf. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
(incorporating the First Amendment one week after the Court ruled in Pierce). If free exercise
was integral to the Court's decision, then one would have expected the parochial school to win
but the military academy to lose. A better reading of Pierce, it would seem, views the First
Amendment argument as an ex post rationale that supplements, rather than explains, the
decision. Cf. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 95 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that
"had [Pierce] been decided in recent times, [the case] may well have been grounded upon First
Amendment principles").
42.
366 U.S. 599 (1961).
43. Id. at 601.
44. Id. at 611 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
45. Id. at 603-04 (majority opinion).
46. Id. at 608 (noting the state's interest in a uniform day of rest).
47.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 & n. 1 (1963).
48. Id. at 399-401.
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employment, Sherbert applied for state unemployment benefits. Her
claim was denied, however, because she "failed, without good
cause . . . to accept available suitable work when offered."49 The state
Employment Security Commission found that religious scruples did
not constitute "good cause" and ruled Sherbert ineligible to collect
unemployment benefits.50
Under Reynolds and Braunfeld, it appeared that the state had
no obligation to accommodate Sherbert's religious practice. Writing for
the Court, however, Justice Brennan refocused the Court's analysis on
the type of conduct proscribed and not whether the claimant could
attach her religious objection to another constitutional guarantee.
Brennan distinguished Sherbert's claim from past denials of religious
exemptions, noting the "conduct or actions so regulated [in past cases]
have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace
or order."5 1 Because Sherbert's refusal to work on Saturdays
"constitute[d] no conduct. . . of a kind within the reach of state
legislation," the Court employed a more exacting analysis. 52 The
commission could deny Sherbert benefits, the Court held, only if its
decision placed no burden on her religious exercise or if any such
burden was "justified by a 'compelling state interest in the regulation
of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate.' "53
Reviving a line of analysis from his Braunfeld dissent, Justice
Brennan noted that a burden exists whenever a law forces an
individual to choose between her religion and some significant
economic interest. 54 When a law places such a burden on religious
exercise, even indirectly and without criminal sanction, the
government must justify the action with a compelling state interest.5 5
"[I1n this highly sensitive constitutional area," the Court held, "only
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion for

.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 403. This seems tenuous at best, as it immediately follows a citation to
Braunfeld, which did not involve any such "substantial threat." While Brennan maintains
Sherbert is consistent with Braunfeld, id. at 408-09, other Justices were unpersuaded. See id. at
417-18 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[I]t is clear to me that in order to reach this conclusion the
court must explicitly reject the reasoning of Braunfeld v. Brown."); id. at 421 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he decision necessarily overrules Braunfeld. .
52. Id. at 403 (majority opinion).
53. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963))..
54. Id. at 404; see also supra text accompanying note 44.
55. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. While the opinion does not use the phrase "strict scrutiny," it
later adds to the "compelling state interest" prong a requirement that "no alternative forms of
regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights." Id. at 407.
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permissible limitation."5 6 The state was unable to meet this heavy
burden, alleging only the potential for false claims that might
ultimately "dilute the unemployment compensation fund [and] hinder
the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work."5 7 The Court
rejected these purported interests on procedural grounds.5 8 For at
least the next twenty-five years, the Court continued to apply strict
scrutiny in cases where a claimant's religious convictions excluded
him from unemployment compensation.5 9
The Court reaffirmed Sherbert nine years later in Wisconsin v.
6
0
Yoder. Three members of the Old Order Amish from New Glarus,
Wisconsin, refused to enroll their fourteen- and fifteen-year-old
children in the local high school. This violated the state's compulsory
education law, which required children to attend school through their
sixteenth birthday. 61 While the Amish do not object to primary
schooling through the eighth grade, 62 they view high school as inimical
to their way of life and antithetical to their religious convictions.63
Instead, the Amish train their own to be productive members of Amish
society. 64

56. Id. at 406 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 407.
58. Id. (noting that South Carolina failed to assert these interests before the state supreme
court). Even if it could reach the question, the Court found nothing in the record to support the
state's fear that insincere claimants would become a drain on the state's coffers. Id. The Court
further stressed that more vocationally debilitating beliefs would be less likely to obtain an
exemption. Id. at 409-10.
59.
See Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) (holding Sherbert applied
to an applicant who did not belong to a formal religion); Hobbie v. Unemp't Appeals Comm'n, 480
U.S. 136, 143-44 (1987) (extending Sherbert to employee whose beliefs changed over course of
employment); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 707 (1981) (reversing denial of benefits to a
claimant who quit his job at a munitions factory due to religious pacifism).
60.
406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972).
61. Id. at 207.
62. Id. at 212:
The Amish do not object to elementary education . . . because they agree that their
children must have basic skills in the "three R's" in order to read the Bible, to be good
farmers and citizens, and to be able to deal with non-Amish people when necessary in
the course of daily affairs.
63. Id. at 210-11 ("[The Amish] view secondary school education as an impermissible
exposure of their children to a 'worldly' influence in conflict with their beliefs.").
64.

Id. at 222-24; see also CATHARINE COOKSON, REGULATING RELIGION: THE COURTS AND

THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 30 (2001) ("An educational expert witness opined that this
combination [of formal and vocational education] was an 'ideal' system of learning, 'superior' to
that of ordinary high school.").
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At the outset, Chief Justice Burger distinguished the Amish
from analogous nonreligious claimants: had the Amish, like Thoreau, 6 5
rooted their actions in the "evaluation and rejection of the
contemporary social values . . . their claims would not . . . rise to the
demands of the Religion Clauses."6 6 The Court rejected the state's
reliance on a Reynolds-like belief-action distinction.6 7 Instead, the
Court applied Sherbert and found the state's purported interests
(preparing children for democracy6 8 and enabling them to be selfreliant members of society6 9 ) lacking as applied to these defendants.

Given these two seminal cases, it seemed that the central analysis to
future religious exemption cases would be whether the government
had asserted a compelling interest.
C. InterpretingAround Strict Scrutiny
While Sherbert and Yoder remained law between 1963 and
1990, the compelling interest standard was frequently criticized by
academics and inconsistently applied by courts. 70 After Yoder, the
Court heard a series of religious exemption cases. Outside of the
unemployment context,7 1 however, "the person seeking the exemption
never won." 72 Instead, the Court tended to distinguish Sherbert and
Yoder in one of three ways: recognizing a compelling interest in

65. See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 85 (Beacon Press ed. 2004) (1854) ("I wanted
to . .. live so sturdily and Spartan-like as to put to rout all that was not life, to cut a broad swath
and shave close, to drive life into a corner, and reduce it to its lowest terms ....
66.
Yoder, 406. U.S. at 215-16.
67. Id. at 220 (noting that "belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight
compartments").
68. Id. at 221-22 (agreeing that "some degree of education" was necessary to prepare
children for democracy but doubting the marginal one-to-two years at stake would further that
interest).
69. Id. at 222 (noting the Amish are "a highly successful social unit within our society").
70. See, e.g., Robert D. Kamenshine, Scrapping Strict Review in Free Exercise Cases, 4
CONST. COMMENT. 147, 147 (1987) (noting that, prior to Smith, the Court "simply look[ed] for and
f[ou]nd[] a way out"). Even when the Court purported to apply strict scrutiny, its analysis
evinced a retreat from the robust test applied in Sherbert and Yoder.
71. See supra note 59 (citing cases applying strict scrutiny to a claimant whose religious
convictions excluded him from unemployment compensation).
72.

FRANK S. RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RELIGION

CLAUSES 32-33 (2007). Professor Tushnet has adduced a more troubling trend in religious
exemption cases: "[P]ut bluntly, the pattern is that sometimes Christians win but non-Christians
never do." Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited,
1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373, 381. Lower courts, however, have been at least marginally more willing
to grant religious exemptions based on the Free Exercise Clause. See RAVITCH, supra, at 201
n.189 (detailing a number of cases in which lower courts granted religious exemptions).
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uniformity, refusing to apply Sherbert in certain settings, or holding
the challenged action did not burden religious conduct.
First, the Court in several cases held that the government had
a compelling interest in promoting uniformity. In a case that arguably
followed from Yoder, a member of the Old Order Amish challenged an
assessment for unpaid Social Security taxes, again relying on Amish
communalism. 73 Relying on Sherbert and Yoder, the district court
invalidated the assessment. 74 The Supreme Court reversed,
identifying three compelling interests for mandatory, universal
participation in Social Security: financial stability,7 5 administrative

convenience, 76 and general taxation.7 7 This distinction follows the line
Justice Brennan drew between Sherbert and Braunfeld: the Sunday
closing law in Braunfeld was permissible because Pennsylvania had a
"strong state interest in providing one uniform day of rest for all
workers."7 8
Second, the Sherbert-era Court also denied claims for religious
exemptions in certain settings where the state's interest is at its apex.
The military is the clearest example of such special settings. In
Goldman v. Weinberger, the Air Force disciplined an Orthodox Jewish
psychologist for wearing his yarmulke in violation of uniform dress
regulations. 79 The Court held that Sherbert did not govern, noting
instead that "[o]ur review of military regulations . .. is far more
deferential than constitutional review of similar laws . .. designed for

73. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1982) ("[The Amish] believe it sinful not to
provide for their own elderly . . . and therefore are religiously opposed to the national social
security system.").
74. Id. at 255 (citing Lee v. United States, 497 F. Supp. 180 (W.D. Pa. 1980)).
75. Id. at 258 ("[M]andatory participation is indispensable to the . . . social security
system.").
76. Id. at 259-60 ("[It would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive social security
system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs.").
77. Id. at 260 ("There is no principled way . . . to distinguish between general taxes
and .. . the Social Security Act.").

78.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963) (emphasis added); see also Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (holding government's "fundamental, overriding
interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education" outweighed a private university's
religiously motivated ban on interracial dating); cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 16667 (1944) (pre-Sherbertcase denying religious exemption from child labor laws).
79. 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986).
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civilian society."8 0 The Court has recognized a similar special-settings
exception for prison regulations.8 1
Third, the Court sometimes interpreted around Sherbert by
holding that a law placed no burden on free exercise or that the
burden was insufficient to warrant heightened scrutiny. In Bowen v.
Roy, for example, Native American parents challenged the federal
government's practice of assigning Social Security numbers, claiming
the practice would "rob the spirit" of their daughter, Little Bird of the
Snow.8 2 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger rejected the
respondents' claim, asserting that the First Amendment has never
been interpreted "to require the Government itself to behave in ways
that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual
development."83 The Free Exercise Clause protects individuals from
compulsion; it cannot coopt the government into the role of
concelebrant. 84 Two years later, relying on Bowen, the Court rejected a
claim that building a highway through and logging in a sacred Native
American forest violated the Free Exercise Clause. 8 Finding that the
burden on religious exercise was not "heavy enough" to trigger strict
scrutiny under Sherbert, the Court denied the exemption and noted
"government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy
every citizen's religious needs and desires." 86 Finally, just three
months before Smith, the Court held that a generally applicable sales
tax "imposes no constitutionally significant burden on .. . religious
practices or beliefs."87

80. Id. at 507 (reasoning the military does not need to "encourage debate or tolerate
protest" but rather strives to "foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de
corps").
81. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350 (1987) (holding prison officials do
not have to accommodate Muslim inmates' religious services). As this Note was going to press,
the Court was considering Holt v. Hobbs, a challenge by a Muslim inmate to a prison facial hair
regulation. See 509 F. App'x 561 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 1490
(2014). However the Court decides, Holt is inapposite here because the regulation is challenged
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, not the Free Exercise Clause.
82. 476 U.S. 693, 696 (1986).
83. Id. at 700. In a separate part of their claim, the respondents challenged a requirement
for parents to furnish a child's Social Security Number to receive AFDC benefits. While the
Court did not reach this question due to an insufficient record, see id. at 714 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring), the various opinions in the case suggest that a separate majority would have voted
to uphold the respondents' AFDC claim. See id. at 716-17, 721 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at
731 (O'Connor, Brennan, & Marshall, JJ., concurring); id. at 733 (White, J., dissenting).
84.
Id. at 700.
85.
Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447 (1988).
86. Id. at 452.
87.
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990).
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D. Employment Division v. Smith and the Retreat to Rational Basis
The years between Yoder and Smith demonstrate the difficulty
of heightened protection for religious conduct in a pluralistic society.
Overaccommodation of religious exemptions from generally applicable
laws proved impossible to administer,88 and a robust application of
Sherbert would render government unable to function.89 By 1990, the
Court had effectively cabined the compelling interest test to cases
factually indistinguishable from Sherbert and Yoder.9 0
In Employment Division v. Smith, the long-anticipated
reexamination of Sherbert finally arrived.9 1 The respondents, two
members of the Native American Church, were employees at a private
drug rehabilitation center. As a condition of their employment, the
respondents were required to abstain from using illicit drugs; as part
of their religion, they were required to ingest peyote during
sacramental ceremonies. 92 These two requirements eventually
collided, and the respondents were fired from their jobs after they
each failed a drug test. 93 Because possession of peyote violated state
law, the state employment commission deemed the respondents to
have been dismissed for "work-related misconduct," and therefore
ineligible for unemployment benefits.9 4 Under Sherbert and
subsequent unemployment compensation cases,9 5 the respondents
presented a strong case for a religious exemption.9 6 Reversing course
without reversing Sherbert or Yoder, Justice Scalia wrote for a six-

88.
See, e.g., Bogen, supra note 14, at 248 ("The Court cannot practically require the
highest standard to justify minimal impacts on speech or religion.").
89.
See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 452 ("[G]overnment simply could not operate if it were required
to fulfill every citizen's religious needs and desires.").
90.
See COOKSON, supra note 64, at 33 (describing the application of Sherbert-Yoder as
"exceptionally minimalist").
91. 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) ("Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes).' " (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring))).
92. Id. at 874.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 874-75 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. See supra note 59 (listing a series of post-Sherbert unemployment-compensation cases
where the Court required a religious exemption from facially neutral eligibility requirements).
96. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981) ("Where the state
conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, . . . a
burden upon religion exists."); see also RAVITCH, supra note 72, at 33 ("Given this precedent,
most people believed that the battle lines in Smith would be drawn over whether the state had
an adequate compelling governmental interest.").
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justice majority that Sherbert does not apply to generally applicable,
religion-neutral laws that indirectly burden religious exercise.9 7
The majority reasoned that Sherbert's compelling-interest
standard applies only in certain types of cases: unemployment claims
and "hybrid situation[s]."98 While the Court had "purported to apply" a
pure Sherbert test in other contexts, 99 it had never employed Sherbert
to invalidate a government action that did not involve unemployment
benefits.1 00 This suggested a narrow reading of Sherbert.'0 Cases like
Yoder and Cantwell, meanwhile, represented another narrow category
meriting strict scrutiny: hybrid claims. 0 2 In hybrid cases, the Court
had recognized exceptions "not [based on] the Free Exercise Clause
alone but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections."1 03 Thus Cantwell was a free speech-free
exercise claim, 104 while Yoder was a religion- specific instance of
parental rights.105 Because the Smith respondents relied solely on the
Free Exercise Clause, they did not pose such a hybrid claim. 106
Even assuming Sherbert and Yoder were not narrower than
once believed, the Court introduced another wrinkle: unlike Sherbert
and its progeny, the law in Smith involved a criminal prohibition. 107
The Sherbert test, the Court held, is "inapplicable to an across-theboard criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct." 08 The

97.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
98. Id. at 878-84.
99.
See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (citing the Sherbert test and
holding that social security taxes do not "interfere[ ] with the free exercise of the Amish").
100. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 883. The Court's claim that Sherbert had been cabined to the
unemployment compensation context is debatable. See, for example, Professor McConnell's
criticism of Smith's use of history and precedent, infra text accompanying notes 116-23,
101. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883.
102. See id. at 881-82. For a discussion of some of the most commonly cited hybrid cases, see
supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
103. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 & n.1 ("[These] cases have specifically adverted to the non-freeexercise principle involved.").
104. Id. at 881 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
105. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925)). The Court hinted that the Free Association Clause might also support a hybrid
claim. See id. at 882.
106. Id. at 882.
107. Id. at 884-85. Two years earlier, the Court had remanded to the Oregon Supreme
Court to determine if sacramental peyote use was prohibited by Oregon's controlled substance
act. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 673-74 (1988). The state court found in the affirmative.
Smith v. Emp't Div., 763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988).
108. Smith, 494 U.S. at 873. The majority's reliance on this factor is somewhat confusing,
since the respondents were not seeking immunity from (nor does it appear that they were ever
threatened with) prosecution; rather, they were invoking their religious beliefs as cause excusing
what would otherwise be "work-related misconduct."
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Court returned to its reasoning in Reynolds, worrying a decision to the
contrary would permit every man "to become a law unto himself."1 09
E. Reaction to Smith
The Court's decision in Smith was-and remains-highly
controversial. Shortly after the decision, Congress overwhelmingly
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA")." 0
RFRA restored the Sherbert-Yoder standard for any substantial
burdens placed on religious exercise "even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability.""' But this reversion was short-lived. In
City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that Congress had overstepped
its Section Five enforcement powers"12 RFRA, as applied to state and
local governments, did not enforce constitutional rights but rather
rewrote states' constitutional obligations to their citizens."i3 The Court
later held that RFRA was valid as applied to the federal governmenteven if Congress could not enforce its obligations against state and
local governments, it could create a statutory protection against
burdensome federal law.114
The legal academy has been largely critical of Smith."i5
Professor Michael McConnell, an erstwhile Tenth Circuit judge, has

&

109. Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
110. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012)); see
also Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise, and the Amicus Brief That
Was Never Filed, 8 J.L. & RELIGION 99, 113-15 (1990) (describing Congress's early efforts to undo
Smith). RFRA passed the House by a voice vote and the Senate by a vote of 97-3. See Bill
Summary & Status 103rd Congress (1993-1994) H.R.1308, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d103:HR1308:, archived at http://perma.cc/C8PJ-KL2Y (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
112. Congress purported to pass RFRA under its "power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of' the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see S.
REP. No. 103-111, at 13-14 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1903 (discussing the
constitutional authority to enact RFRA); H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 9 (1993) (same).
113. 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326
(1966)); see also id. at 520 (requiring "congruence and proportionality" between the constitutional
injury threatened and the preventative means adopted).
114. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Unido do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424
n.1 (2006) (describing RFRA as "a statutory rule comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in
Smith").
115. See, e.g., Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a "Rule" Doesn't Rule: The Failure of
the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith "HybridRights Exception," 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 573,
581 (2003) ("Smith has the rather unusual distinction of being one case that is almost
universally despised .. . by both liberals and conservatives.").
It would be a mistake, however, to say that the academy is uniformly critical of Smith.
Richard Duncan, for example, suggests that the evils of Smith have been greatly overstated and
notes that "free exercise is alive and well in the wake of Smith." Richard F. Duncan, Free
Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi, and the General Applicability
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been one of the most forceful critics of Smith.11 6 McConnell argues
that Smith misstates history' 17 and precedent,"1 8 and that earlier
cases flatly contradict the opinion's use of absolutes:
The Smith opinion states baldly: "We have never held that an individual's religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate." In Wisconsin v Yoder, however, the Court had stated that
"[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement
for government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
119
exercise of religion."

McConnell also rejects the hybrid rights claims purportedly
exemplified by Yoder.1 20 "[T]he opinion in Yoder," he points out,
"expressly stated that parents do not have the right to violate the
compulsory education laws for nonreligious reasons."121 Even
accepting the hybrid rights description, however, McConnell notes
that the petitioners' ingestion of peyote could be described as a hybrid
speech-religion activity:
Why isn't Smith itself a "hybrid" case? Whatever else it might accomplish, the
performance of a sacred ritual like the ingestion of peyote communicates, in a rather
dramatic way, the participants' faith in the tenets of the Native American Church.
Smith and Black could have made a colorable claim under the Free Speech Clause that
the prohibition of peyote use interfered with their ability to communicate this message.
If burning a flag is speech because it communicates a political belief, ingestion of peyote
is no less. And even if Smith and Black would lose on a straight free speech claim,
following the logic of Smith's explanation of Yoder, why shouldn't their claim prevail as
a "hybrid" with their free exercise claim? 122

Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 851 (2001). Likewise, Ronald Krotoszynski calls Smith
out for overdue praise, arguing "Smith better advances equality among religious sects than did
Sherbert and Yoder." Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free
Exercise, and the (Underappreciated)Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1189, 1199 (2008).
However, these scholars remain in the minority.
116. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter Free Exercise Revisionism]; Michael W. McConnell,
Religion and Its Relation to Limited Government, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 943 (2010); Michael
W. McConnell, Religious Freedom, Separation of Powers, and the Reversal of Roles, 2001 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 611; Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115 (1992).
117. See Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 116, at 1117-18 (noting early state and
colonial practices exempting religious objectors from generally applicable laws).
118. See id. at 1120 (describing the Smith Court's application of precedent as "troubling,
bordering on the shocking").
119. Id. (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 1121-22.
121. Id. at 1121 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972)).
122. Id. at 1122.
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Given these inconsistencies, McConnell concludes that the hybrid
rights distinction "was not intended to be taken seriously."l 23
Professor Douglas Laycock, a leading First Amendment scholar
and litigator, has been equally strong in his condemnation of Smith.1 24
A few weeks after the Smith decision, Laycock wrote, "[C]hurches and
believers are [now] fully subject to the tax and regulatory burdens of
the modern welfare state."1 2 5 Providing his own solution to the
problem, Laycock opined, "I think the text and the purposes of the
Free Exercise Clause require that government leave religion as free as
can be managed."1 26 Rather than making exemptions routine, the
Smith Court has made them "exceptional at best; it may think
exemptions should not exist." 2 7
Other scholars have focused on the disarray Smith has
engendered in lower courts. Steven Aden and Lee Strang argue the
"hybrid rights claims" distinction fails to offer a rule with predictive or
descriptive value.1 28 One circuit has explicitly rejected the hybrid
rights justification altogether,1 29 while most others have been
unsympathetic to hybrid claims.130 Daniel Crane observed that some
state-court judges "continue to apply the pre-Smith compelling
interest test," though it is rare that such cases produce a religious
exemption.1 3 1

123. Id.; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hileah, 508 U.S. 520, 567
(1991) (Souter, J., concurring) ("If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional
right is implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith
rule . . . ."); Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of 'Tests" Under the Religion
Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 335 (describing the hybrid rights theory as "a make-weight to
'explain' Yoder").
124. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (1994) (criticizing the majority's approach in Smith); Douglas Laycock, The
Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (exploring the theoretical and practical
implications of Smith) [hereinafter The Remnants of Free Exercise]; Laycock, supra note 110
(publishing an unfiled amicus brief in support of a petition to rehear Smith).
125. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, Watering Down the Free Exercise Clause, in 2 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
66, 67 (2011). Laycock argues that Smith was based on four misconceptions: neutrality, belief
and practice, religion, and the judicial role. The Remnants of Free Exercise, supra note 124, at
10-38.
126. The Remnants of Free Exercise, supra note 124, at 68.
127. Id.
128. Aden & Strang, supranote 115, at 605.
129. See id. at 587 (citing Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180
(6th Cir. 1993)).
130. See id. at 588 ("The First, Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all
faced cases where the courts ruled that the claim accompanying the free exercise claim lacked
merit and dismissed the hybrid claim.. . .").
131. Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State
Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235, 269 (1998).
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III. A VISION OF (RELATIVE) CLARITY: INCIDENTAL BURDENS ON
EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT
While developing and then dismantling the compelling interest
test, the Court simultaneously heard challenges to generally
applicable laws based on the First Amendment's free speech
guarantee. Seemingly unaware of the conceptual overlap between
these cases, the Court has more ably and consistently articulated the
standard of review for free speech challenges to generally applicable
laws than it has for free exercise challenges. Section A surveys the
two-track approach the Court takes in free speech cases, paying close
attention to the distinction between content-based and content-neutral
regulations. Section B then looks at the Court's long history of finding
that "speech" does not require the utterance of a syllable or penning of
a letter, but can be communicated through conduct. Finally, Section C
looks at the O'Brien test, an intermediate standard of review through
which the Court balances the state's need for general regulations of
health, safety, and order against the individual's right to free
expression.
A. Two-Tier Approach in Free Speech Cases
When the Court reviews a purported burden on free speech, it
employs a two-tier analysis. 132 The Court subjects content-based
regulations 133 to heightened scrutiny: if the speech is not categorically
excluded from First Amendment protection, then the regulation must
withstand strict scrutiny.1 34 However, for content-neutral regulations,
the Court applies one of two intermediate standards of review. 135

132. This taxonomy is borrowed, with slight modification, from Day, supra note 10, at 492
("A commonly accepted starting point in free speech analysis is the observation that the Court
has adopted a 'two-track' system: 'content-based' and 'content-neutral.' ").
133. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994) ("Our principal
inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech'without reference to the content of the regulated speech."' (quoting Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))).
134. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18-22 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny after
finding the defendant's actions were not within any exempted category).
135. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (establishing a fourpart test for government actions that indirectly burden speech). But see Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 410 (1989) (holding that O'Brien is inapplicable where the regulation is related to the
suppression of speech).
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1. Tier One: Content-Based Regulation of Speech
Content-based restrictions strike at the core of First
3 6 and are presumptively invalid."' To overcome
Amendment valuese
this presumption, the government must fit the regulation within an
unprotected 3 8 category of speech, successfully argue that the Court
should recognize a new category, or meet strict scrutiny.13 9
The most straightforward way for the government to regulate
speech on the basis of its content is to fit the type of speech within a
preexisting category of unprotected speech. In Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, the Court recognized that, at common law, some
categories of speech were outside even the most robust understanding
of free speech; these categories remain beyond full First Amendment
protection.1 4 0
Because these categories are a product of the common law, they
are not "static."141 Creative state solicitors general could thus
conceivably convince the Court to recognize a new category of
unprotected speech. This is the most difficult option, however-the
Court has not recognized a new Chaplinsky category since 1982142 and
has since suggested that it will take the extraordinary step of creating
a categorical exemption only when the speech poses cognizable
harm.143
136. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("At the heart of the First
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and
beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence.").
137. E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
138. While these categories are often described as "unprotected," the Court has cautioned
that these forms of speech are simply less protected and can only be regulated consistent with
First Amendment values. Id. at 383-84 ("[These areas of speech can, consistently with the First
Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content [but are not]
vehicles for content discrimination .... ).
139. Turner, 512 U.S. at 642; see also McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014)
(noting that a content-based regulation "must satisfy strict scrutiny-that is, it must be the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest" (citation omitted)).
140. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem."). Recently, the Court identified nine such categorical exemptions to
First Amendment protection: imminent incitement to violence, obscenity, defamation, speech
integral to criminal conduct, fighting words, child pornography, fraud, true threats, and speech
presenting a "grave and imminent threat" that is within the government's power to prevent. See
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012).
141. Day, supra note 10, at 494.
142. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (upholding state ban on the sale of
child pornography).
143. See, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545 (noting that past prohibitions on false statements
all involved "legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement"). Compare Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (holding that the state may not prohibit the private possession

2015]

BAPTIZING O'BRIEN

197

These narrow alternatives excepted, most content-based
regulations of speech will be upheld only if they survive strict
scrutiny, the "most exacting scrutiny" applied to government
regulations. 144 To withstand strict scrutiny, a statute or regulation
must "(1) serve a compelling governmental interest; (2) be narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest; and (3) be the least restrictive means
of advancing that interest."1 45 While this standard was once described
as "strict in theory, but fatal in fact," 146 courts occasionally, though
infrequently, find a content-based regulation to be constitutionally
permissible.1 47
2. Tier Two: Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech
The government can also burden speech through contentneutral means in two ways: time-place-manner regulations or
incidental regulations of expressive conduct. The Court applies two
potentially overlapping but analytically distinguishable tests for these
modes of regulation.
The time-place-manner doctrine provides the government a
way to regulate "manner[s] of expression [that are] incompatible with
the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." 48 The
current articulation of the time-place-manner test comes from Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, a challenge to New York City's regulation of the

or viewing of obscene materials), with Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (holding states
may prohibit the private possession or viewing of child pornography because "[tlhe pornography's
continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm").
144. Turner, 512 U.S. at 642.
145. ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc.
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)); see also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347
(1995) ("When a law burdens core political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny,' and we uphold
the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.").
146. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
147. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193-95 (1992) (upholding a Tennessee
statute prohibiting electioneering within one hundred feet of a polling place based on the
compelling government interest in preventing voter intimidation and election fraud).
148. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). This doctrine originated in
Cox v. New Hampshire, where the Court held that a city may require parades and marches to
acquire permits "in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public
highways." 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941). In its early history, the doctrine was limited to instances
where the speech "intrudes on the privacy of the home, or the degree of captivity makes it
impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure." Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975). However, the Court gradually relaxed this requirement.
E.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding anticamping
ordinance as applied to demonstrators who wanted to sleep on the National Mall and in
Lafayette Park to call attention to homelessness).
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use of sound systems in Central Park.1 49 Responding to noise
complaints about concerts in an amphitheater in the park, the City
began requiring performers to use city-owned sound equipment
operated by an independent sound technician.1 0 Rock Against Racism,
whose annual concerts were a driving force behind the new regulation,
argued that the regulation burdened their speech. The Court granted
certiorari to "clarify the legal standard applicable to governmental
regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech,"1 5 1
holding that time-place-manner restrictions must be (1) content
neutral, (2) narrowly tailored regulations that (3) serve a significant
government interest and (4) preserve "ample alternative channels for
applied to all
communication."1 5 2 Because the regulation
performances, was narrowly tailored to eliminating a public nuisance,
and limited only the volume (as opposed to the medium or content) of
the respondents' speech, the Court upheld the regulation. 5 3
The second category of content-neutral regulation, discussed in
depth below,1 54 involves "governmental regulations that are directed
towards nonspeech behavior, but that have an adverse impact on
protected speech."1 55 In such cases, the Court currently applies the
O'Brien test, which states that the regulation must: (1) be within the
power of the government; (2) further "an important or substantial
government interest"; (3) be unrelated to the suppression of speech;
and (4) be "no greater than is essential" to further that interest. 5 6
Some scholars, relying on dicta in Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, argue "the O'Brien analysis was subsumed in
the . . . time, place, or manner formulation."15 7 While it is true that
there is significant overlap between O'Brien and Ward, the two tests
serve different constitutional ends.15 8 The time-place-manner doctrine
asks whether a regulation that purports to focus on the "physical form

149. 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989).
150. Id. at 786-87.
151. Id. at 789.
152. Id. at 791 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). The Court emphasized that the
narrow tailoring requirement is not a least-restrictive-alternative prong, meaning the Ward test
is not a strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 798-99.
153. Id. at 791-803.
154. See infra Part III.C.
155. See Day, supra note 10, at 499. This generally protects expressive conduct, but scholars
have considered its application to other categories. See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the
Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1008 n.36 (1976) (discussing and rejecting
application of O'Brien to campaign finance laws).
156. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
157. See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 13, at 1359 (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 293).
158. Day, supra note 10, at 495.
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of protected speech [is] actually directed towards the content of the
speech"; the O'Brien test, meanwhile, evinces a "concern for the
overreaching effect of governmental restrictions that have an adverse
impact on protected expression." 15 9 These unique policy goals are
evident in two regards. First, when the government regulates the
time, place, or manner of speech, it is unmistakably targeting speech.
The O'Brien test, however, governs only when the challenged
regulation has an indirect or incidental relation to speech. 160
Similarly, the O'Brien test does not require that the government
"leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information"; 16 1 on this score, the test requires only that the
regulation be "unrelated to the suppression of free expression." 1 6 2
Because the O'Brien test does not require "ample alternative channels
for communication," the inadvertent but complete suppression of
speech might be acceptable. In the case that gives the O'Brien test its
name, for example, the Court upheld O'Brien's conviction for
publically burning his draft card as an act of protest. 163 The result was
that O'Brien could not make this particular statement at any time, in
any place, or in any manner, meaning the law likely would have failed
a traditional time-place-manner analysis. 164
Furthermore, the Court has continued to apply O'Brien even
after Clark.1 65 For example, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., decided
six years after Clark, the proprietors of two strip clubs challenged an
Indiana ban on fully nude live dancing. 166 Applying O'Brien, the Court
upheld the ban, even though doing so left the club operators with no
alternative means of communicating their message-a result
incompatible with the time-place-manner analysis. 16 7 Thus, while
159. Id. at 495-96.
160. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 n.8 (1974) (per curiam) (holding O'Brien
inapplicable when the asserted interest is "directly related to expression in the context of [the]
activity"); see also Day, supra note 10, at 496 ("[A time-place-manner] regulation is established
for the purpose of abridging protected expression, [while] an incidental regulation is a
nonpurposeful abridgment.").
,161. E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
162. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
163. Id. at 382.
164. While O'Brien technically could have used a different medium to protest the draft, in
his case, "the medium [was] the message." Dorf, supra note 10, at 1215 n.184.
165. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1991) (plurality opinion); see also
id. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring) ("I also agree with the plurality that the appropriate analysis
to determine the actual protection required by the First Amendment is the four-part enquiry
described in [O'Brien] .... .").
166. Id. at 562-63 (plurality opinion).
167. Id. at 563; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989) (holding that a flagburning law was related to the suppression of speech, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny

200

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1:177

there is overlap between the time-place-manner doctrine and the
O'Brien test, the two tests retain independent analytical value.1 68
B. "Speech ...

Brigaded with Action"169 : Regulation of
Expressive Conduct

Burning a flag. 170 Forming a peace symbol.' Wearing a black
armband. 172 Nude dancing.17 3 Often, speech goes beyond talking or
writing to include conduct inextricably linked to an underlying
communicative intent. Such forms of communication are alternatively
referred to as "symbolic speech" and "expressive conduct."
The Court indicated a willingness to recognize First
Amendment-protected conduct as early as 1931.174 In Stromberg v.
California, a counselor at a Communist summer camp was convicted
of violating the state's Red Flag Law, which prohibited any person
from "display[ing] a red flag, banner or badge . . . as a sign, symbol or
emblem of opposition to organized government."1 7 5 While ultimately
holding the law void for vagueness, the Court seemed willing to accept
that Stromberg had "spoken" despite not writing a word or uttering a
syllable.17 6 Three decades later, the Court noted in a Civil Rights Era
sit-in case that the First Amendment is "not confined to verbal
expression," but rather "embrace[s] appropriate types of action."17 7
The Court announced its modern test for symbolic speech in
Spence v. Washington.1 78 Spence, who taped a peace symbol to a
United States flag as a form of protest, was convicted under a
Washington statute prohibiting the "improper" display of the flag.' 7 9
While Spence neither wrote nor talked, the Court nonetheless found

rather than O'Brien); Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 704-05 (1986) (holding a city
health code placed too indirect of a burden on speech to trigger O'Brien).
168. See infra Part V.B.2.
169. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
170. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397.
171. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam); cf. Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74,
83 n.4 (2007) (expressing no opinion on a § 1983 plaintiffs claim that the First Amendment
protects nude performance art).
172. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
173. E.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 562-63 (1991).
174. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 361, 369-70 (1931).
175. Id. at 361-62.
176. Id. at 369-70.
177. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (reversing convictions following a
peaceful library sit-in).
178. 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (per curiam).
179. Id. at 405-07.
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that he spoke, delineating a two-part test for expressive conduct: (1)
Was there "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message"? (2) If so,
was it likely "that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it"?180 The Court continues to apply this test to expressive
conduct and symbolic speech claims.'"'
C. The O'Brien Test
In United States v. O'Brien,182 the Court articulated its
standard of review for neutral laws that indirectly burden speech.18 3
In 1966, David O'Brien, a nineteen-year-old, draft-eligible man,
burned his draft card on the steps of a courthouse in front of a large
crowd, including several FBI agents. 8 4 O'Brien was later convicted of
violating the Military Training and Service Act ("MTSA"), which
prohibited defacing, destroying, or otherwise changing a draft card.18 5
The First Circuit reversed, holding that "his actions constituted
symbolic speech protected by the First Amendment."1 86
Accepting without analyzing the lower court's finding that
O'Brien was convicted for speech, 8 7 the Court reversed the decision
and reinstated the conviction. First, the Court found that the MTSA
was a content-neutral regulation.1 88 Next, the Court noted that
expressive conduct occupies some intermediate level of importance in
free speech jurisprudence-by necessity its protection cannot be
coterminous with that of pure speech, but neither is it unprotected.1 89

180. Id. at 410-11.
181. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (applying Spence in a flag-burning
case).
182. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
183. See Donald A. Fishman, United States v. O'Brien, in FREE SPEECH ON TRIAL:
COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE ON LANDMARK SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 130, 140-41 (Richard

A. Parker ed., 2003) (noting that O'Brien remains controlling precedent in expressive conduct
cases).
184. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369; see also id. ("[O'Brien] stated he had burned his registration
certificate because of his beliefs, knowing that he was violating federal law.").
185. Id. at 370. Prior to the amendment, the MTSA only required registrants to carry their
certificates at all times.
186. Fishman, supra note 182, at 131.
187. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (proceeding "on the assumption" that the Free Speech
Clause applies).
188. See id. at 375 ("[The MTSA] deals with conduct having no connection with speech.").
189. See id. at 376 ("This Court has held that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms.").
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For this intermediate interest, the Court articulated an intermediate
test:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction . .. is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. 190

The Court held the MTSA met each element and was therefore valid
facially and as applied. 191
In later cases, the Court further clarified the O'Brien test. In
Texas v. Johnson, for example, the Court implied that the third
prong-whether the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of
speech-is analytically prior to the others.1 92 It is only if the
regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech that intermediate
scrutiny applies; otherwise, the regulation must withstand strict
scrutiny.1 93 Also, in Ward, the Court clarified that the "no greater
than ...
essential" prong is not a least-restrictive-alternative
analysis.1 94 It is enough that the challenged regulation "promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation."1 9 5 Additionally, the Court has
refused to overly attenuate the burden requirement.1 96 In Arcara, local
authorities closed an adult bookstore that condoned the solicitation of

190. Id. at 377.
191. Id. at 382.
192. 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989). Technically, the first prong-within the government's
constitutional powers-is a threshold question. However, if the government is acting ultra vires,
the Court is unlikely to reach the First Amendment challenge. See Dorf, supra note 10, at
1202 & n.111 ("Prong one is not properly part of First Amendment law because all regulation
must be within the government's constitutional powers.").
193. See id. ("If the State's regulation is not related to expression, then the less stringent
standard we announced in United States v. O'Brien .. . controls.").
194. See 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989); cf. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (holding,
one week after Ward, that the "necessary" prong of the commercial speech test requires only a
"'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends" (internal
citations omitted)). While Ward concerns a time-place-manner regulation, the Court often makes
comparisons across the two standards' overlapping elements.
195. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985));
see also John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1484-85 (1975) (describing
O'Brien as "requir[ing] only that there be no less restrictive alternative capable of serving the
state's interest as efficiently" (footnote omitted)).
196. See Arcara v. Cloud Book Stores, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705-06 (1986) ("The severity of
this burden is dubious at best, . . . since every civil and criminal remedy imposes some
conceivable burden on First Amendment protected activities."); see also Cowen v. Cowles Media
Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991) (holding the First Amendment does not shield a newspaper from
civil liability for breach of contract).
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prostitution on the premises.19 7 Reversing the New York Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court held that the purported burden was too
indirect to trigger intermediate scrutiny.198 As in other First
Amendment cases, the burden of persuasion shifts to the government
once the challenger has made a prima facie free speech claim.1 99
In summary, the Court continues to apply O'Brien
notwithstanding some analytical overlap with the time-place-manner
doctrine. 200 To claim an O'Brien exemption, the party challenging the
general law must show that the law placed an indirect (but not too
indirect 201) burden on expressive conduct. The focus then shifts from
the speaker's message to the government's justification. 2 0 2 The Court
will first determine whether the regulation is related to the
suppression of speech. 20 3 If the regulation is directed at speech, strict
scrutiny applies; if it is not, the Court applies the remaining elements
of O'Brien: whether the regulation is within the government's
constitutional powers, furthers an important government interest, and
is no more extensive than necessary. 204 While the latter two elements
resemble strict scrutiny, the Court requires neither a compelling
interest 205 nor a least-restrictive-alternative analysis.206

197. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 699-700.
198. Id. at 706-07 ("[Tlhe First Amendment is not implicated by the enforcement of a public
health regulation of general application against the physical premises in which respondents
happen to sell books."). The Court further concluded that O'Brien applies only in two
situations: "where it was conduct with a significant expressive element that drew the legal
remedy, ... or where a statute based on a nonexpressive activity has the inevitable effect of
singling out those engaged in expressive activity." Id. (internal footnote and citations omitted).
199. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972) (noting "the burden was upon the [state]
to justify its decision" (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968))). But see
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 108 (1988) ("[T]he Court
starts from the presumption that [laws that indirectly burden free speech] raise no [Flirst
[A]mendment issue." (citing Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937))).
200. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
201. See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706-07.
202. See Fishman, supra note 182, at 141-42 ("The test does not examine the defendant's
mode of expression or even the intended message.").
203. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989).
204. Id.
205. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (requiring only an "important or
substantial" interest).
206. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (noting that O'Brien is not
a least-restrictive-alternative analysis).
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IV. EXEMPTIONS FROM GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW UNDER O'BRIEN
AND SMITH.

The current state of First Amendment jurisprudence poses an
odd asymmetry when it comes to generally applicable laws that
indirectly burden First Amendment rights. Section A begins by posing

a hypothetical that will be helpful in discussing the problems with and
solution to the O'Brien-Smith conundrum. Section B then surveys the

scholarly literature noting the glaring inconsistency between O'Brien
and Smith. Section C shows that this inconsistency has relegated
religion to second-class status in the First Amendment canon,
violating the neutrality principle. Finally, Section D makes the case
that Smith has weakened the Free Exercise Clause and robbed it of
any value independent of the Establishment Clause.
A. Free Exercise and Free Speech on Fire
Imagine two neighbors: Francis and Henry. On the last Friday
of November, both Francis and Henry independently decide to burn all
of their worldly possessions in the parking lot of the Hamilton
Township Mall. Hamilton, beset by summer forest fires in recent
years, had enacted the Forest Fire Prevention Act of 2012 ("FFPA"),
which requires a permit for all uncontained outdoor fires. The district
attorney charges both Francis and Henry with violating the FFPA.
At trial, both men claim protection under the First
Amendment. Francis, who has recently embraced theological
asceticism, claims that he burned his belongings as an act of worship
that would purify his soul, purge corrupting influences, and make him
more like his deity. Henry, meanwhile, has been reading
transcendentalist authors, leading him to realize that he is a slave to
the accoutrements he once called conveniences. To make a point,
Henry chose to burn everything he owned at a mall on Black Fridaythe church of consumerism on its holiest day.
Both displays were outward manifestations of inward
convictions that are at the core of the First Amendment. Thus, were
we to erect a legal regime tabula rasa, we would, at a minimum,
expect the law to treat both men the same. Moreover, when we
interpose the text of the First Amendment 207 and the words of the
Supreme Court, 208 we might even expect a thumb on the scale in favor
of religious expressive conduct. The opposite is in fact true.

207.
208.

See infra text accompanying note 235.
See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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Francis would have no First Amendment-based defense. Under
Smith, a religious adherent can claim an exemption from a law only
by proving that the law is not generally applicable, not neutral
towards religion, or directly burdensome on religious exercise. 20 9 The
FFPA is applicable to all would-be fire starters, neutral towards
religion, 210 and only indirectly burdens worship. Moreover, the Smith
Court held that the First Amendment offers no protection to the
religious from generally applicable criminal prohibitions. 211
Henry, however, would have a colorable First Amendment
defense. As a threshold matter, Henry has "spoken" without uttering a
word. Because the FFPA prohibits fires regardless of their message (or
lack thereof), a court would apply a tier-two, content-neutral standard
of review. Moreover, this is not a regulation of the time, place, or
manner of Henry's speech but a complete prohibition. Therefore,
O'Brien applies, and the ordinance satisfies the first three prongs: a
fire-prevention ordinance is within the powers of local government in
furtherance of an important interest unrelated to speech (to wit,
safety). Thus, Henry's claim hinges on whether the regulation is "no
greater than essential." Henry could argue there is no risk of a forest
fire in the middle of a paved parking lot in late November. While the
FFPA might be necessary in densely wooded areas or during the dry
summer months, application of the law year-round and town-wide is
overly restrictive and provides no marginal benefit to the
government's purported interest in preventing forest fires. 212
While it is far from certain that Henry would win, he stands a
fighting chance, where Francis's claim would be summarily rejected.
Thus, when O'Brien and Smith are compared side-by-side on
analogous facts, the unmistakable conclusion is that the current state
of jurisprudence accords greater protection to philosophically
209. In practice, this really comes down to neutrality. If a law is not neutral, it cannot be
generally applicable. And while a nongeneral, nonneutral law might place no burden on religion,
any burden would be necessarily direct.
210. Assume for present purposes that the town council did not harbor an intent to hinder
religious fires. Had the FFPA been passed, for example, after a religious sect began performing
burnt offerings in Hamilton, this might be a different case. Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu,
Inc. Aye v. City of Hileah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1991) ("Official action that targets religious conduct
for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial
neutrality.").
211. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990).
212. It is true that Henry could probably be convicted under other laws-for example,
trespass if he had been asked to leave or arson if he had damaged another's property. However,
the Court has emphasized that it is not enough that the defendant is guilty of something; if the
challenged prohibition is unconstitutional, that part of the conviction fails. See R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379-80 & n.1 (1992) (noting the other laws petitioner could have been
convicted under).
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motivated conduct than it does to religiously motivated conduct. 2 13
This is at odds with the Court's own words. 214
B. Scholarly Treatment
Unsurprisingly,
scholars have noticed
this apparent
inconsistency between the O'Brien test and the treatment under
Smith of similar laws that indirectly burden religious exercise. A few
years after Smith, Thomas McCoy called for a "coherent" approach to
the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech, free exercise, and
nonestablishment. 215
For
McCoy,
the
unifying
theme
is
"inadvertence," 216 and he argues inadvertent conflicts with the Free
Speech Clause or the Religion Clauses pose "precisely the same
jurisprudential question." 217 This fact has eluded the Court. 2 18 McCoy
suggests that the Court apply the time-place-manner doctrine to
inadvertent burdens on religious exercise and endorsements of
religious practices. 219 While McCoy succinctly diagnoses the problem,
his remedy, as discussed below, 220 proves unworkable in free exercise
cases because it would require courts to assess the centrality of a
specific act of worship to an individual's faith.
David Bogen also argues in favor of intermediate scrutiny for
generally applicable laws that indirectly burden religious exercise. 221
Noting the problems with both extremes, Bogen argues that an
intermediate standard of review "assures both the government's
213. Professor Leiter poses a similar hypothetical with an opposite outcome. BRIAN LEITER,
WHY TOLERATE RELIGION 1-3 (2013). This hypothetical is distinguishable, however, because
Professor Leiter's book discusses the broader philosophic underpinnings of religious tolerance,
not its particular treatment under the U.S. Constitution. In fact, the case Professor Leiter relies
upon is a Canadian case that permitted a religious exemption under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. See Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R.
256, 2006 SCC 6 (Can.). His hypothetical, therefore, is inapposite in considering the treatment of
religious conduct under the First Amendment.
214. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
215. See generally McCoy, supra note 13 ("[T]he Supreme Court has yet to develop a coherent and consistent approach to the application of [the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause].").
216. Id. at 1342-43.
217. McCoy, supranote 13, at 1343.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1364-83; see also id. at 1344 ("[T]he conceptual methodology developed by the
Court for dealing with inadvertence in the free speech context is the only sensible approach to
the inadvertence problem in [the free exercise and establishment contexts].").
220. See infra Part V.B.2 (arguing that McCoy's argument overlooks subtle differences
between the two tests).
221. See Bogen, supra note 14, at 253 ("The obvious candidate for a test to evaluate neutral,
generally applicable laws is O'Brien.").
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ability to accomplish its legitimate functions and the protection of
speech and religion from unnecessary regulation." 22 2 Unlike McCoy,
but like this Note, Bogen concludes that the O'Brien test is the
"obvious candidate for a test to evaluate neutral, generally applicable
laws" because the test "permits the government to accomplish any
significant legitimate objective . . [but] decreases the likelihood that a
law with an impermissible purpose will survive strict scrutiny." 2 23
Writing in 1997, Bogen opined the Court would soon "make its free
speech decisions consistent with its free exercise jurisprudence." 2 24
But no such consistency has emerged. Also, for Bogen, the appeal of
O'Brien is its convenience as a happy medium between two
unworkable extremes. 225 Yet, he fails to address at any length the
substantive analogy between expressive and religious conduct.
Brian Freeman believes that a unified standard for First
Amendment-based exemptions from generally applicable laws is
necessary to maintain neutrality between religious and secular
expression. 226 The current approach, Freeman argues, is hopelessly
"muddled" as the court vacillates between "the polar extremes of
rational basis scrutiny and strict scrutiny." 227 Sherbert and Yoder
privileged religion over nonreligion; Smith does the opposite. Thus,
intermediate review, supplemented with a hard look at legislative
purpose, promotes neutrality between religious and political
expression. 228
Not all commentators believe intermediate scrutiny is
necessary or appropriate. Professor Day, for example, argues that
O'Brien is "toothless" and "the Court for the most part treats
incidental burdens as largely irrelevant for constitutional purposes." 229
Similarly, Professor Stone has argued the Court's standard of review
222. Id. at 205. Bogen also argues that, while Smith rejects strict scrutiny, it does not
require rational basis. See id. at 206, 212-13 ('The rejection of the 'compelling governmental
interest' test does not necessarily foreclose the application of a lesser standard . . . ."). This seems
unlikely given Justice Scalia's criticism elsewhere of intermediate scrutiny, see Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 580 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[W]e should avoid wherever
possible . . . a method of analysis that requires judicial assessment of the 'importance' of
government interests . . . ."), but it nonetheless underscores the fallacy of viewing standard of
review as a binary question.
223. Id. at 253-55.
224. Id. at 204.
225. Id. at 253-54 (describing O'Brien as an "obvious candidate" and "the best alternative"
to competing approaches).
226. Freeman, supra note 13, at 11 (calling for a harmonized treatment of "religious, ethical,
philosophical, moral, or political" expression).
227. Id. at 81.
228. Id. at 57.
229. Dorf, supra note 10, at 1180, 1204.
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under O'Brien is less robust than its elements would suggest.2 30
Notably, Smith's author himself, Justice Scalia, has recognized the
inconsistency between Smith and O'Brien and advocated for
consistency-but in the other direction. In Barnes, the Court applied
O'Brien and rejected a First Amendment challenge to Indiana's ban on
completely nude live dancing.231 Concurring in judgment, Justice
Scalia returned to the formalistic analysis he employed in Smith. "[A]
general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at
expression," Scalia wrote, "is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny
at all."2 3 2 Comparing the Court's opinion in Smith with its O'Brien
analysis in Barnes, Scalia suggested a similar approach to the similar
challenges: "In the one case, as in the other, if the law is not directed
against the protected value (religion or expression) the law must be
obeyed." 233
Despite these degrees of difference, commentators generally
agree that the jurisprudence regarding generally applicable laws that
indirectly burden First Amendment rights is a mess and has been for
at least two decades. Their proposed solutions each seek to resolve the
cognitive dissonance between how the Court speaks about First
Amendment rights and the way it actually protects those rights.
C. Relegating Religion to Opinion
As the hypothetical above demonstrates, the law currently
accords more protection for nonreligious conduct than for religious
conduct. While a normative debate persists as to whether religion
deserves special treatment, 23 4 this question lies beyond the scope of
this Note. For present purposes, a tautology will suffice: religion in the
United States is constitutionally significant because the Constitution
says so.235

230. Stone, supra note 199, at 50-52.
231. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1991).
232. Id. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 579 ("There is even greater reason to
apply this approach to the regulation of expressive conduct. Relatively few can plausibly assert
that their illegal conduct is being engaged in for religious reasons; but almost anyone can violate
almost any law as a means of expression.").
233. Id. at 579.
234. See generally, e.g., LEITER, supra note 213 (arguing that religious exemptions to
generally applicable laws should be granted only when doing so would not "shift burdens or risks
onto others"); John Finnis, Does Free Exercise of Religion Deserve Constitutional Mention?, 54
AM. J. JURIs. 41 (2009) (outlining the normative justifications both for and against constitutional
protection of religion).
235. Notably, the drafters of the First Amendment included the Free Exercise Clause but
removed a similar clause protecting conscience. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 612-13 (1992)
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In the past, the Court has recognized that religion is different
from, and its protection elevated over, opinion. As noted above, Yoder
distinguished the Amish respondents' convictions from Thoreau's
philosophical separatism, extending protection to only the former. 236 A
general writ to obey only the laws that accord with one's opinions
would create a state where every man is a "law unto himself.""' It
would be impossible to raise an army if draftees could refuse to fight
in an unjust war, 3 8 or fund the government if taxpayers could credit a
pro rata share of programs with which they disagree. 239 Religion,
however, plays a gatekeeping role that makes claims for exemption
less numerous, more easily verifiable, and more broadly shared. 240
Thus, as Yoder recognized, the Constitution arguably allows for
greater protection of religious exercise than it does expressive conduct.
At a minimum, the text of the Constitution would seem to require
parity. However, as the story of Francis and Henry demonstrates, the
Court has flipped this on its head and subordinated religious
expression to expressive conduct. This regime violates the core First
Amendment value of neutrality, which requires not just neutrality
between sects but neutrality between religion and nonreligion. 241 By
offering less protection under Smith than under O'Brien, the Court
penalizes the religious actor vis-AL-vis the nonreligious actor.
D. What's Left of the Free Exercise Clause?
After Smith, generally applicable laws that indirectly burden
religious conduct must bear only a rational relationship to a valid

(Souter, J., concurring) (describing the excision of a proposed clause protecting "the rights of
conscience" from the First Amendment prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights). While it is
unclear why the conscience clause was excised, the drafting history makes clear that the First
Congress was more concerned with religious objection than conscientious objection. See
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1481 (18th ed. 2013) ("It is
unclear why the first Congress deleted the final phrase .....
236. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
237. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (quoting Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
238. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971) (denying draft exemptions
to individuals with conscientious objections to particular wars, as opposed to war in general).
239. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-61 (1982) (refusing to exempt the
Amish from Social Security taxes because "there is no principled way ... to distinguish between
general taxes and . . . Social Security [taxes]").

240. See supra note 232.
241. E.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("The First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.").
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state interest to survive a challenge under the Free Exercise Clause. 242
What, then, is the role of the Free Exercise Clause in the Smith era?
Setting aside unemployment claims, the Free Exercise Clause only
has independent force in challenging nonneutral or nongeneral laws
that directly burden religious exercise. 243 But, given the American
tradition of religious pluralism, it would be highly unlikely for a
legislature to directly regulate religious exercise. 244 Moreover, a law
that is not neutral concerning religion-a law that burdens or benefits
religious exercise-would likely already be invalid under the
Establishment Clause. 245 The current state of law has led Professor
Greenawalt to wonder "whether anything that is not redundant
remains" of the Free Exercise Clause. 246 Similarly, Professor McCoy
argues that the current state of law "read[s] the Free Exercise Clause
as essentially meaningless surplusage in the contemporary context." 247
By itself, the fact that a constitutional provision has outlived
its usefulness is not dispositive. The Third Amendment, for example,
is all-but-invisible in constitutional law; 2 4 8 no one would seriously
argue that this calls for the Court to reexamine its (nonexistent) Third
Amendment cases. But the political process has produced an
equilibrium regarding forced quartering that has not developed for
religious liberty. With so many live disputes, the Free Exercise Clause
must be more than a constitutional hall monitor. In the wake of

242. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3 ("[G]enerally applicable, religion-neutral laws
that . . . burden[ ] a particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest . . . ."). As mentioned above, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, an
attempted repeal of Smith, has been narrowed to create a statutory right against certain types of
federal laws and regulation. See supra text accompanying notes 110-14. This Section discusses
only the scope of constitutionalfree exercise protection, which RFRA failed to expand.
243. This also sets aside hybrid rights, since such claims stand or fall on the strength of the
accompanying right. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu, Inc. Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 567 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring) ("[I]f a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would
actually obtain an exemption . . . under another constitutional provision, then there would have
been no reason . . . to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.").
244. See id. at 564 (noting that Lukumi "provided a rare example of a law actually aimed at
suppressing religious exercise").
245. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting
that a government action violates the Establishment Clause when its "actual purpose is to
endorse or disapprove of religion" or the action "in fact conveys a message of endorsement or
disapproval").
246. Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 156-57
(2004) (emphasis omitted).
247. McCoy, supra note 13, at 1350.
248. See Tom W. Bell, The Third Amendment: Forgotten but Not Gone, 2 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 117, 140 (1993) ('The Supreme Court has never given [the Third Amendment] more than
a passing reference . . . ."). According to Westlaw, only fifty-one published federal opinions
through 2014 had cited the Third Amendment.
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Smith, it is unclear what role the Free Exercise Clause is to play
besides an added layer of protection against laws that would likely be
defeated by the Establishment Clause and our culture of
constitutionalism.
V. GENERATING CONSISTENCY AND ARGUING ALTERNATIVELY

The Court could immediately and dramatically clarify its free
exercise jurisprudence by applying the O'Brien test for expressive
nonreligious conduct to religious acts of worship or sacrament. Absent
such a specific determination, religious claimants may nonetheless
seek intermediate protection by recasting their expressed belief as
expressive conduct. This Note proposes two solutions. Section A
recommends a short-term litigation strategy based on the assertion
that acts of worship and the observance of sacrament are
substantively indistinguishable from expressive conduct. So long as
the Supreme Court applies rational basis to free exercise claims,
creative advocates should plead free exercise and expressive conduct
claims in the alternative in an effort to obtain the heightened
protection of free speech law. Section B concludes that such a
patchwork approach to the First Amendment is unsatisfactory and
that, in the long run, the Court should adopt an intermediate
standard-specifically the O'Brien test-to claims for religious
exemptions from generally applicable laws.
A. Short-Term: Recast Religious Expression as Expressive Conduct
Most acts of worship serve a dual sacramental-communicative
purpose. Primarily, acts of worship are symbols of personal devotion,
fidelity, or virtue. But many religions are based on claims of universal
truth, and thus behaviors adopted by an adherent implicitly
encourage others to behave likewise. This truth claim is both didactic
(instructing fellow adherents how to act) and evangelical
(demonstrating to nonadherents the acts of a well-ordered life). A
coherent First Amendment jurisprudence would treat communicative
religious conduct the same as it treats communicative political
conduct. 249

249. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 107 ("Why shouldn't religious practices that are
performed for religiously symbolic . . . reasons enjoy at least the same level of constitutional
protection as other expressive conduct . . .?")
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Consider the case of Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church
("FAPC") in Manhattan. 25 0 Located along New York's premier
shopping locale and just four blocks from Central Park, FAPC allowed
homeless persons to sleep on its steps and on a small strip of property
between the church's wall and the public sidewalk. 251 The church
viewed its outdoor space "as a sanctuary for the service-resistant
homeless who prefer not to sleep in shelters." 252 In 2001, New York
City ordered FAPC to discontinue the practice because, it alleged,
FAPC was creating a public nuisance, violating several city codes
about the use of sidewalks, and unlawfully maintaining a shelter.253
FAPC sued under § 1983 (among other federal and state causes of
action), alleging that the City had violated three First Amendment
guarantees: free exercise, free speech, and free association. 254 On brief
before the Second Circuit, FAPC emphasized that this practice had a
dual role: it discharged their moral obligations to the less fortunate
while simultaneously preaching a message of charity to passersby. 255
FAPC ultimately obtained a permanent injunction on both free speech
and free exercise grounds, allowing it to continue providing overnight
shelter to homeless persons. 256 In entering the injunction, the district
court observed, "[B]y allowing such activity, the Church engaged in
expressive conduct by communicating a highly particularized, easily
understood, religious and political message regarding how homeless
persons should be treated by society." 257
The Fifth Avenue Presbyterian case is probably more
exemplary than it is exceptional. Indeed, many-perhaps most-acts
of worship could be said to have an evangelical purpose. Beyond
making claims to truth and the well-ordered life, religious worship is
often intended to tell a story. The first question of the Passover Sedar
is, "Why is this night different from all other nights?" and the
elements of the Sedar proceed to tell the story of the Jews' Exodus
from Egypt. Likewise, the Eucharist commemorates the actualizing
250. Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2002).
251. Id. at 572. Persons who chose to sleep on church property were "given a list of rules,
which includes instructions to clean up after themselves and a prohibition on begging, loud
music, disruptive behavior, and foul language." Id.

252. Id.
253. Id. at 572-73.
254. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants at 2, Fifth Ave. Presbyterian, 293 F.3d
570 (Nos. 02-7073, 02-7153).
255. Id. at 28 (arguing the practice "is designed not only to serve the spiritual needs of the
homeless and those who minister to them, but also to evangelize passersby").
256. Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, No. 01-Civ.-11493(LMM), 2004
WL 2471406 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004).
257. Id. at*10.
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event of Christianity, with the Apostle Paul writing, "For as often as
you eat this bread and drink this cup, you proclaim the Lord's death
till He comes." 25 8 The hajj reenacts Allah's protection of Hagar and
Ishmael, as well as Mohammed's pilgrimage from Medina to Mecca. 259
Each of these ceremonies is integral to telling the story of faith and is
often a means of passing the faith down to future generations.
Once the prevalence of expressed belief is recognized, it
becomes hard to justify the disparate treatment. Consider Spence,
where the Court held the defendant was constitutionally entitled to
hang an American flag with a duct-taped peace sign outside of his
home as a war protest.260 But what if, instead of a peace sign, Spence
was an Orthodox Jew and had affixed to his door a mezuzah, a small
decorative box containing the Shema.2 61 The Torah commands the
mezuzah not only as a matter of devotion but also as a means of
communicating God's commandments to others. 262 The message "The
Lord is God and He is one" is every bit as communicative as "Make
love, not war." However, when these messages are reduced to symbolic
form-either in an altered flag or a decorative box-the standards
shift, with the protest flag receiving greater protection than the
mezuzah. 263 Likewise, many religions also prescribe or proscribe
certain forms of dress as a means of professing holiness, purity, or setapartness. 264 In Tinker, the Court held that wearing black armbands
in violation of a school dress code was protected symbolic speech. 265
Yet under Smith, wearing a yarmulke or a tilaka to profess religious

258. 1 Corinthians11:26 (emphasis added).
259. See F.E. PETERS, THE HAJJ 3-58 (1994) (describing the origins of the hajj).
260. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414-15 (1974) (per curiam).
261. The Shema is a Jewish prayer beginning with the admonition, "Hear, 0 Israel, the
Lord is our God, the Lord is One." MEIR LEVIN, WITH ALL YOUR HEART: THE SHEMA IN JEWISH
WORSHIP, PRACTICE, AND LIFE 11 (2002).
262. Deuteronomy 6:5-9.
263. Spence is somewhat inapposite because the Court noted in dicta that the law was
related to the suppression of speech. 418 U.S. at 413-14 n.8. Nonetheless, had Spence's display
been punished by a law that was content neutral, it would have nonetheless been protected by at
least intermediate scrutiny. But cf. Bloch v. Forschholz, 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (suggesting in dicta that a religion-neutral law that indirectly prohibited mezzuzahs would
likely survive under Smith).
264. The Amish, for example, wear unadorned garb to symbolize their integration with
Amish culture and separation from worldly culture. See DONALD B. KRAYBILL, THE RIDDLE OF
AMISH CULTURE 57-70 (2001) ("In Amish society, dress signals group membership and
submission to the moral order."). Similarly, Buddhist monks wear plain robes to demonstrate
"ascetic humility," separateness from the material world, and "commitment to the teachings of
the Buddha." LYNNE HUME, THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF DRESS 104-08 (2013).

265.

See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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devotion receives minimal protection against generally applicable
laws.
So long as the Court continues to apply greater deference to
general laws that indirectly burden religious exercise, First
Amendment advocates should argue that their clients' acts of worship
have a secondary communicative, evangelical, or didactic purpose. For
example, in the hypothetical presented in Section IV.A, whether
inspired by religious or secular text, both Francis and Henry are
asserting that simplicity is part of the well-ordered life. And returning
to the examples discussed above, a (religion-neutral) government ban
on candles, wine, or travel to Saudi Arabia would place an indirect
burden on celebrating Chanukkah, observing the Eucharist, or
completing the hajj, respectively. Even if litigants could not identify
some truth claim contained in these practices, they could still seek an
O'Brien exemption on the basis that these acts communicate stories
central to their faiths. Thus, the space between O'Brien and Smith
creates an opportunity for creative advocates to recast their clients'
religious conduct as expressive conduct, triggering an intermediate
standard for a claim that would otherwise receive only minimal
scrutiny.
Such an approach would also be consistent with Smith's
recognition of hybrid rights claims. 2 66 In a hybrid claim, the party

seeking the exemption attaches her free exercise claim to another,
more protected constitutional right. While this is often described as
holding that hybrid claims trigger strict scrutiny, a more precise
interpretation is that hybrid claims trigger whichever standard of
review is the highest. Theoretically, that higher standard of review
need not be strict scrutiny; an O'Brien claim could be the weightier
half of a free exercise hybrid rights claim. Thus, this approach could
be described as a Smith hybrid rights argument, with the resulting
standard of review being intermediate scrutiny.
B. Long-Term: Towards an Intermediate Standard
In the long run, recasting religious conduct as expressive
conduct only adds nuance and complexity to an area of law already
overburdened by distinctions without differences. Ultimately, the
Court must articulate a consistent standard of review for generally
applicable laws that indirectly burden First Amendment rights. This
Section makes the case that O'Brien offers the proper standard of
review.
266.

Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
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1. Why Intermediate Scrutiny?
Merely recognizing an inconsistency between Smith and
O'Brien does not establish that intermediate scrutiny is the proper
standard of review. One could argue, as Justice Scalia has, that Smith
and O'Brien are inconsistent but that rational basis review should
govern all claims for First Amendment-based exemptions from
generally applicable laws. 2 67 However, constitutional history does not
mandate such an approach, and a universal rational basis standard
would do little to resolve the flaws in the current approach.
First, exemptions from generally applicable laws that
indirectly burden religious exercise are consonant-or at least not at
odds-with the Framers' understanding of religious liberty. Justices
Scalia and O'Connor extensively sparred over this question of original
intent in City of Boerne.268 Justice O'Connor believed that the Framers
were more accommodating of religious practice than the Smith
majority gave them credit for. 269 To support this claim, Justice
O'Connor drew from colonial charters, early state constitutions, and
the practices of state governments in the late eighteenth century. 270
Justice O'Connor also cited the Northwest Ordinance's guarantee that
"[njo person ...
shall ever be molested on account of his mode of
worship or religious sentiments." 271 Based on these early practices,
Justice O'Connor concluded, "[A]round the time of the drafting of the
Bill of Rights, it was generally accepted that the right to 'free exercise'
required, where possible, accommodation of religious practice." 272
Justice Scalia, defending his opinion in Smith, disagreed. 273
Scalia argued that the material cited by Justice O'Connor "either has
little to say about the issue or is in fact more consistent with
Smith."274 The state analogues to the Free Exercise Clause were "a
virtual restatement of Smith: Religious exercise shall be permitted so
long as it does not violate general laws governing conduct." 275
Ultimately, Scalia concludes, the dissent's weakness is in what it fails
267. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[A]s
a general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression, it is not subject to
First Amendment scrutiny at all.").
268. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
269. See id. at 549 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The historical evidence casts doubt on the
Court's current interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.").
270. See id. at 550-52.
271. Id. at 554.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 539 (emphasis omitted).
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to-and cannot-identify: "a. . . case refusing to enforce a generally
applicable statute because of its failure to make accommodation." 2 76
Unconvinced by the dissent's argument, Justice Scalia continued to
rely on the historical and precedential analysis employed in Smith. 277
Professor McConnell argues that the actual answer is
somewhere in the middle and that the historical record does not
present a neat case one way or the other. 278 In support of Smith is the
influence of John Locke on the Framers. 279 For Locke, one way to quell
the tension between church and state was to prevent "religious and
[from] intermeddl[ing] in the others'
governmental leaders
province." 280 This belief manifested itself in two relevant ways:
"advocacy of legislative supremacy with respect to conflicts between
public power and individual conscience and . .. rejection of religious
exemptions." 281 In addition to Lockean theory, proponents of Smith
also find support in the writings of Thomas Jefferson, William Penn,
and the highest courts of at least two states. 282
But there is also significant historical support on the other side
of the ledger, evidence McConnell finds more compelling. 283 For
example, eight state constitutions at the Founding included "language
that appears to be an early equivalent of the 'compelling interest'
284
test."
McConnell believes it is unlikely the Framers, who modeled
the Free Exercise Clause after equivalent state provisions, would have
taken such a narrow approach when the states were generally willing
to accommodate religious exercise. 28 5 This approach had deep roots in

276. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
277. Id. at 542-43.
278. See McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 116, at 1119 ("At most, the Court
could have said that there are two constitutional traditions, both with impressive pedigrees, and
that persons of common sense and good will have come down on both sides of the question.").
279. Id. at 1117-18; see also Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understandingsof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1430-35 (1990).
280. McConnell, supra note 279, at 1432; see also JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 33 (James H. Tully ed., 1983) (1689) ("No Peace and Security ... can ever be
established or preserved amongst Men, so long as this Opinion prevails, That Dominion is
founded in Grace, and that Religion is to be propagated by force of Arms." (emphasis omitted)).
281. Id. at 1433.
282. See Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 116, at 1117 (noting that several founding
fathers, as well as the supreme courts of Pennsylvania and South Carolina, rejected religious
exemptions).
283. See id. ("On the other hand, the history would have revealed other evidence-more
substantial, in my judgment-in favor of the broader exemptions position.").
284. Id. at 1117-18.
285. See id. ("These provisions were the likely model for the federal free exercise
guarantee . . . .").

2015]

BAPTIZING O'BRIEN

217

colonial charters and practices. 286 While these were legislative and not
judicial exemptions, this was a time before judicial review, and thus
exemptions could only come from the legislature. 287 Finally, James
Madison, who (unlike Jefferson) was involved in drafting the First
Amendment, "advocated free exercise exemptions. . . and proposed
language for the Virginia free exercise clause that was even more
protective than the . . . provisos of most states."288 Accordingly, there
is sufficient support to discount the Smith Court's conclusion that the
allowance for religious exemptions "contradicts both constitutional
tradition and common sense." 2 8 9

Additionally, exporting Smith to the free speech context would
magnify the problems in Smith. There would remain, under such an
approach, the inscrutable legacy of unemployment claims and the
jurisprudential "make-weight" of hybrid rights claims. 29 0 Such an
approach would also create some hard choices in free speech cases by
obviating not only O'Brien but also the time-place-manner doctrine.
Would the government be able to prohibit protest marches by passing
sidewalk ordinances or prohibit political billboards through zoning
laws? The Court would likely have to fashion another category of
hybrid rights or categorical exemptions, but this would exacerbate a
key flaw of Smith.2 91
A final reason that intermediate scrutiny is the proper
approach is something of a Goldilocks solution: whereas Yoder was too
much and Smith too little, O'Brien is just right. The Smith opinion
was the culmination of several decades of case law proving that the
Sherbert-Yoder test was undesirable in practice. 292 However, proving
that strict scrutiny failed does not necessitate removing the acts from
heightened scrutiny altogether. 293 As McCoy writes, "The problem
with the Sherbert approach was that the Court seemed to have
substituted one extreme . . . for the earlier extreme." 294 If the
compelling interest test failed and the rational basis approach is
failing, 295 process of elimination supports some standard of review in

286.
287.

See id. at 1118-19 ("The practice of the colonies and early states bore this out.").
See id. (noting that legislatures had the responsibility for "upholding constitutional

norms").

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 1119.
Id. (quoting Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990)).
Greenawalt, supra note 123, at 335.
See supra notes 118, 128-31 and accompanying text.
See supraPart II.C.
See supranote 222.
McCoy, supra note 13, at 1348.
See supra Part IIE.
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the middle. An intermediate approach offers a third way that protects
religious conduct without hamstringing government actors. Such an
approach would be solicitous of religious convictions-particularly
minority religious convictions that might escape the eye of the
legislature-but deferential to the state's exercise of police powers.
2. Why O'Brien?
Once intermediate scrutiny is identified as the proper standard
of review, the next task is determining which version of intermediate
scrutiny works best in the free exercise context. From content-neutral
free speech claims, there are two candidates: the time-place-manner
doctrine and the O'Brien test.
Professor McCoy has advocated importing the time-placemanner test. 29 6 Again, a time-place-manner restriction must be (1)
content neutral, (2) narrowly tailored, (3) and in furtherance of a
significant government interest while also (4) leaving "ample
alternative channels for communication." 297 McCoy doubts whether
O'Brien remains a stand-alone constitutional test.29 8 In Clark, the

Court noted that the O'Brien test is "little, if any, different from the
standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions." 29 9 From this,
McCoy concludes "the O'Brien analysis was subsumed into the more
broadly applicable time, place, or manner formulation." 300 This goes
too far. While the time-place-manner and O'Brien tests are similar
and many cases would come out the same way under either test, there
remain subtle differences in the elements, which lead to starkly
different outcomes. 301 Thus, the Clark Court hedged, not committing
itself to explicitly consolidating the two approaches but instead
recognizing only the potential for overlap. 302 Moreover, in cases

296. McCoy, supra note 13, at 1364-73.
297. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).

298. McCoy, supranote 13, at 1359.
299. Clark, 468 U.S. at 298.
300. McCoy, supranote 13, at 1359.
301. The O'Brien facts, for example, would fail the time-place-manner doctrine since the
regulation left no alternative channels by which O'Brien could make his statement. See supra
notes 158-64. Cases like Ward, meanwhile, would fail under the O'Brien test because the
regulations were designed to suppress speech.
302. In a footnote, the Court cautioned reading too much into this, noting that it had
muddled O'Brien and the time-place-manner doctrine. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 298 n.8 ("[O]nly
recently, . . . the Court framed [an] issue under O'Brien and then based a crucial part of its
analysis on the time, place, or manner cases." (citation omitted)).
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following Clark, the Court has continued to apply the O'Brien test.30 3

Thus, notwithstanding the Court's dicta in Clark, the O'Brien test
remains "controlling precedent in symbolic speech controversies."30 4
The time-place-manner doctrine is a poor fit in free exercise
law because it asks whether the regulation "leave[s] open ample
alternative channels for communication." 305 McCoy writes that this
would translate to "an assessment of the importance to the individual
of the restriction on his or her religiously motivated conduct and the
availability of alternative courses of conduct that would serve the
individual's religious purposes nearly as well as the prohibited
conduct." 306 However, such an analysis is both improper and
inapplicable in the free exercise context. It is improper because it asks
courts to wade into matters of centrality-in other words, it forces
judges to ask, "Can one be a faithful X while doing (or despite not
doing) Y?"307 It is also inapplicable because, whereas the political actor
can usually make her point in other ways, acts of worship are
undertaken in compliance with divine prescriptions that usually do
not allow for alternative means of completion. 308 Thus, as Professor
Dorf notes, the "concept of an alternative means of expression has no
obvious free exercise analogue." 309
In addition to being inappropriate and inapplicable, this
analysis is unnecessary. O'Brien remains good law and avoids the
issue of centrality entirely. The O'Brien test focuses on the
government's asserted interest in and justification for the
regulation. 310 The Court can still rely on the Ballard rule 311 to screen
out charlatans. But the Court need not wade into intractable matters
of church doctrine and individual devotion. In the free exercise
context, the O'Brien test would limit courts to a proper judicial
303. See supra text accompanying notes 165-68.
304. Fishman, supra note 183, at 141.
305. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
306. McCoy, supranote 13, at 1369.
307. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) ("It is not within the judicial
ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith . . . ."); see also United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting an "overriding
interest in keeping the government . . . out of the business of evaluating the relative merits of
differing religious claims").
308. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech in the United States and Canada,55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5, 27 (1992) ("A person who acts from religious conscience feels he has no alternative; a
person expressing an idea wants to do so effectively, but probably does not ordinarily feel some
inner compulsion to use a particular means.").
309. Dorf, supra note 10, at 1215.
310. Fishman, supra note 183, at 142.
311. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1944) (holding that courts may
consider the sincerity, but not the substantive truth or relative importance, of religious claims).
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function within their institutional competency and, therefore, is
preferable to the time-place-manner approach.
3. The Baptized O'Brien Test
In practice, very little of the O'Brien test would change once
exported to the free exercise context. The Court should retire the
"within the constitutional power of the Government" prong because, as
noted above, 312 this is not a First Amendment inquiry. The remaining
three prongs of O'Brien, however, would function similarly. As a
threshold question, the reviewing court would first ask whether the
asserted state interest is unrelated to religion. If not, strict scrutiny
governs; if so, the court would apply the remaining prongs of O'Brien
by evaluating whether the regulation furthers an important
government interest in a manner no greater than essential to achieve
that interest.
The Court should resist the urge to delve too deeply into
subjective legislative intent. In O'Brien, Chief Justice Warren warned

about the unreliability of legislative intent 313 and the subterfuge such
an inquiry would invite. 314 Regardless of the merits of legislative
intent more generally, Chief Justice Warren stressed the need to
"eschew guesswork" when the Court is asked to "void a statute that
is ... constitutional on its face." 315 This proviso notwithstanding, the

Court has occasionally been more willing to rely on legislative history
in religion cases than it was in O'Brien. 316 This impulse should be
resisted. Reducing the complexity of the legislative process to the

opinion of a single member of a multimember body undermines the
rule of law and invites ends-motivated analysis. 317 Instead, courts
should focus on the text of the law and the broader context
surrounding its passage. 318

312. See supranote 192.
313. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968) ("What motivates one
legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to
enact it . . . .").

314. See id. (refusing to invalidate a statute that would be valid had a "legislator made a
'wiser' speech about it").
315. Id.
316. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-60 (1985) (concluding that a school
moment-of-silence law was unconstitutional because a state senator called the law "an 'effort to
return voluntary prayer' to the public schools").
317. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[D]iscerning the subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost
always an impossible task."); supra note 313.
318. Church of the Lukumi Babaulu Aye v. City of Hileah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993):
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This problematic inquiry has proven unnecessary to protect
religion from discriminatory legislation. In Lukumi, the Court
unanimously invalidated a local regulation on animal slaughter
designed to suppress Santeria, a West African religion that performs
animal sacrifice. 319 While Justice Kennedy's majority opinion includes
a discussion of legislative intent,3 20 that section commanded just two
votes. 321 Without divining legislative intent, the Court had no problem
finding that the text and effect of the statute impermissibly targeted
the practice of Santeria.322 Because legislative history is unnecessary
to protect against subtle discrimination, the Court should avoid the
pitfalls of discerning "the" intent of a multimember deliberative body.
A baptized version of O'Brien likely would not have changed
the outcome in Smith. 323 Initially, the Court would have held that the
law was unrelated to religious expression. The Court would then have
analyzed the strength of Oregon's asserted interest in prohibiting the
possession of peyote and balanced it against the severity of the
prohibition. Few would gainsay the importance of the state's interest
in a uniform criminal prohibition of narcotics. 324 Moreover, since
O'Brien does not require a least-restrictive-alternative analysis, the
Court would have found the regulation "promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation." 32 5 Thus, it is likely that the respondents in Smith would
still have been denied an exemption under a free exercise version of
the O'Brien test.

Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be
shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free
Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked as well as
overt. "The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental
categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders."
(quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
319. Id. at 542.
320. Id. at 540-42.
321. See Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 571 F.3d 960, 981 (9th Cir. 2009) (Clifton, J., concurring)
(noting the use of legislative intent in Lukumi was "nonprecedential").
322. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534-36.
323. Instead, the analysis might have followed Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, in
which she found that the peyote ban withstood even the compelling government interest
standard. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903-05 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that departing from Sherbert is "unnecessary" because the state "has a compelling
interest in prohibiting the possession of peyote").
324. While the Smith dissenters wrote that the state's purported interest was not
compelling, id. at 909-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting), in an O'Brien analysis, the interest only has
to be "important or substantial."
325. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
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In fact, moving from Smith to O'Brien in the free exercise
context would result in only a slight doctrinal shift. O'Brien lacks the
teeth of a compelling interest standard and has just slightly more bite
than rational basis. The difference in outcome would likely be most
pronounced in cases like those involving Francis and Henry, where
secular and religious conduct differs only in subjective motivation.
More fundamentally, this new test would advance neutrality by
treating similarly situated litigants similarly. It would also have an
effect in cases where the government's purported interest is less
established than it was in Smith, where the state's interest in
curtailing drug possession was both clear and absolute. The case law
following Smith is sparse, however, so it is hard to predict how great
the shift would be.
VI. CONCLUSION

For over two and a half decades, O'Brien and Smith have
survived in an awkward coexistence. The result has been a confused,
inconsistent, and underdeveloped body of case law that underprotects
expressed belief while privileging nonreligious expressive conduct.
Harmonizing these tests under a single standard would produce a
more manageable, truly neutral approach to conscious-based
objections to neutral laws of general applicability.
Standards of review say something about what society believes
is worthy or in need of protection. The dangers of majoritarian
suppression of both speech and religious practice are similarly grave.
Because both speech and religion are equally in need of protection
from the vicissitudes of democratic society, a difference in the level of
protection can only be explained by differing societal values attached
to each class of activity. This, however, cannot be--or should not bethe case. But when one compares O'Brien and Smith side by side, it is
clear that First Amendment jurisprudence currently preferences
expressive conduct over religious conduct, at least with regards to
indirect burdens posed by generally applicable laws.
A coherent theory for generally applicable laws that indirectly
burden First Amendment-protected conduct is more administrable
than the current patchwork regime, which lower courts have struggled
to consistently apply. 32 6 The Court currently underprotects religious
expression and unnecessarily distinguishes between religiously and
politically motivated conduct. By recognizing that religious conduct is
expressive conduct and according the same protection to each, the
326. See supra notes 128-31.
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Court could clarify its free exercise jurisprudence, standardize its
First Amendment analysis of generally applicable laws, and restore
the elevated status of religious exercise in American constitutional
order.
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